The World Wide Web has become an extremely popular information service. Large HTTP packets result in network congestion. Proxy cache servers are widely deployed on the Internet to overcome this obstacle. However, the approach yields an undesirable phenomenon -a small set of users misuse proxy servers to mirror the entire contents of Web sites. This behavior wastes network resources; increases WWW servers' loads; increases users' waiting time, and violates copyrights. Approaches to designing a proxy server with WWW usage control and to making the proxy server effective on local area networks are proposed to prevent such abnormal WWW access and to prioritize WWW usage. Finally, we implement a system, ProxyBreaker, to demonstrate the approaches. The implementation reveals that the proposed approaches are effective, such that the abnormal Web access does not reoccur.
Introduction
The WWW has become the most popular offering on the Internet because of its ease of use and universal access. In fact, in a study of backbone usage (Thompson, 1997) , HTTP (Berners-Lee, 1996; Fielding, 1999) packets comprised two-thirds of all activity, which causes serious network congestion. Proxy cache servers are widely utilized to overcome this obstacle.
A proxy server has several significant advantages. First, it reduces waiting time, because remote objects are cached in the local proxy server. Second, it facilitates more efficient use of bandwidth by caching objects that can then be repeatedly used. Third, it shares the load of popular WWW sites, since it acts as a partial reduplication site for the WWW servers. These above advantages, and the lack of WAN bandwidth have encouraged the users of the Taiwan Academic Network (TANet) to use proxy servers. In fact, almost all of TANet's HTTP overseas traffic passes through the proxy cache servers.
A particular event motivated the construction of a proxy server to control abnormal Web usage. In August 1998, a librarian of the National Central University (NCU) received a complaint from the Association of American Physics, stating that a user at NCU downloaded many papers (roughly 900 Mbytes) from their Web site via an NCU's proxy server in a single night. Tracing the access log showed that an impatient graduate student applied the teleport (Tennyson, 2001) to download the entire WWW site. Similar cases also occurred at other universities in Taiwan. In fact, in December 1999, another national university was banned from accessing the digital library operated by a well-known electronic publisher.
Such inappropriate mirroring causes several negative impacts on the Internet.
The load on WWW servers is increased.
A few users consume most of the WAN bandwidth. The remaining users' waiting time is increased.
Service providers probably lose their customers owing to network congestion or server overload.
Mirroring may violate copyright.
Even worse, if a WWW server rejects the access of proxy servers to prevent mirroring, then all proxy users will be denied.
Normally, when users do not use a proxy server, WWW servers can recognize abnormal users and directly forbid their accesses. Unfortunately, when HTTP requests are served via a proxy server, the WWW servers can recognize only that server, and not the real users behind the proxy. Restated, proxy servers hide abnormal access.
Approaches to designing a proxy server with WWW usage control and to making the proxy server effective on local area networks were proposed to prevent such abnormal WWW access and to prioritize WWW usage. Finally, a system, ProxyBreaker, was implemented to illustrate the approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the design issues and deployment of the system. Section 3 elucidates ProxyBreaker's implementation. Section 4 briefly describes related work. Finally, we summarize conclusions.
Web traffic control by a proxy
This section discusses the design issues and deployment of the proxy server with traffic control.
Proxy design with usage control
Many proxy servers (Cacheflow, 2001; Cisco, 2000; Squid, 2001) are not equipped with Web usage control functions. The addition of such functions is discussed here.
Source code modification versus external functional module
We can add new functions of a proxy server in two ways -modifying source codes and adding external modules. The former performs better and satisfies most requirements. However, the source code may not be available. Moreover, programmers must take time to read the code.
The time required is particularly long if the code was written in a language unfamiliar to the programmers. The last restriction is conformance. The code must be updated when the original proxy software issues a new version. Maintaining codes is time-consuming.
Adding external modules also strengthens the proxy. This method has several advantages.
First, no source code is needed. Without the public source code, adding external modules is the only way to improve the original system. Second, the module can be coded in any appropriate language, regardless of the language originally used to program the server. Third, the method provides better conformance, because a proxy server is considered to be a black box, and its input and output rarely change. Accordingly, the external module can be easily integrated with the proxy server. Updating the module is unnecessary when a newer version of the proxy is 4 issued. However, the main drawback of adding external modules is that the system's 
Issues regarding the external functional module
This subsection introduces four approaches to integrating an external module with a proxy server.
Hijack URLs. Figure 1 (a) depicts the complete procedure. The external module is placed in front of the proxy server to hijack the input URL. The hijacked URL is processed and redirected to the proxy server. Then, the server fetches the Web page and returns it to the external module. Finally, the external module forwards the page to the client. In this approach, the module checks whether the input URL should be forwarded to the proxy. Additionally, the module examines the page, returned from the proxy, to filter out any inappropriate content, including adult or violent material, or replaces the page with a warning if a user abuses network resources.
Redirect URLs. Many proxies (Cacheflow, 2001; Cisco, 2000; Wessels, 2001 ) offer a redirection interface for plugging in an external program and processing input URLs, as depicted in Figure 1 (b). The module determines whether the input URL should be replaced with a new URL, using an access control list. If so, the HTTP connection is directed to a new URL, rather than the original one. The difference between URL hijacking and URL redirection is that the former approach intercepts the requests outside the proxy server. The proxy does not recognize that its request is hijacked. In contrast, in the latter approach, the proxy actively redirects the requests to the module. URL hijacking can check a page's contents but URL redirection cannot.
Redirect pages. Some proxy servers (Danzig, 1998) allow page redirection. They redirect original pages to an external program. Then, the program returns new or original pages to the proxy servers. Finally, the servers transmit the pages to users.
Figure 1(c) shows the complete process. The difference between page redirection and URL redirection is that the former approach checks a page's contents and if necessary, replaces the page. The latter approach, however, merely examines the page's URL.
Analyze log. The external module analyzes access logs generated by proxy servers, and then offers feedback to alter the proxy server's status to control Web usage, as depicted in Figure 1 (d). Furthermore, this approach can be combined with the above approaches. Simple combination involves adding the log-analyzing function to the external module of the previous approaches. The module changes the proxy server's operation according to the results of the log-analysis.
Additional issues
This subsection addresses other important requirements of a proxy with usage control.
Real time control
Timely detection of abnormal usage and a quick response are essential. However, such a requirement cannot easily be met, since a proxy server must process massive requests. Suppose the log analysis method is adopted to activate the monitor system. A straightforward method for meeting the real-time requirement is to analyze the access log immediately after the proxy receives a new request. However, this approach leads to busier disk I/O and worse performance degradation. Alternatively, analyzing the log in batches reduces the negative impact of the monitor overhead on the proxy server. For example, suppose that a proxy server can download Web pages at 100 Kbytes/sec and that the maximum allowed Web usage is 100 Mbytes/hour.
Let the overuse margin be 1 Mbytes. The system is guaranteed to detect the overuse before the user's usage exceeds 101 (100 + the overuse margin) Mbytes per hour. The system must measure the usage every 10 (1000/100) seconds, to achieve the goal. That is, according to the overuse margin, the system determines an appropriate period for analyzing the log, rather than monitoring incoming requests whenever they are received.
Self adaptation
The system must be adapted to changes in network environments to further reduce the monitor overhead. For example, traffic on TANet starts increasing in the morning, and reaches a peak in the afternoon. It then declines and reaches a minimum at nearly 5:00 a.m. In this case, a self-adaptive system should automatically increase its monitoring interval at 10:00 a.m. when the network is busier and the transmission speed is lower than at other times. This adaptation prevents the monitor overhead from seriously degrading the proxy's performance. However, the system must adopt a shorter monitoring period when the network is faster (e.g. 5:00 a.m.) to ensure that abnormal access is not missed.
Prioritized service
Prioritized service requires a monitoring system that offers flexible management policies for different Web servers and clients. For example, electronic publication sites normally dislike readers to download a large amount of data in a short period. Hence, they probably require that usage does not exceed an upper bound, such as 50 Mbytes/24 hours. In contrast, commercial
Web servers seek access by as many users as possible, because their advertising revenue is proportional to access times. Usage by their clients must not be restricted. Similarly, clients have different requirements. For example, a graduate student probably needs larger usage than an undergraduate student. Client-server or server-client usage control is sometimes required.
For example, a company may require that the use by research developers of an electronic publication site is uncontrolled, but their access to commercial Web servers is limited.
Proxy deployment
The strategy offered earlier primarily employs proxy servers to control HTTP traffic.
However, a proxy server does not act as a router or gateway and HTTP packets do not always pass through it; reducing the strategy's effectiveness. Accordingly, two approaches to capturing as many Web requests as possible are proposed.
Transparent proxy
A transparent proxy (Cohen, 1999; Danzig, 1998; Heddaya, 1998; Krishnan, 1999; Legedza, 1998; Rodriguez, 2000; Williams, 1998) does not require users to configure their browsers for use with proxy servers. That is, all requests are automatically redirected to the proxy servers, regardless of the browser setting. Two mechanisms activate a transparent proxy.
Redirected packets. HTTP requests are redirected to a proxy server via either a layer-4 switch or a policy-based router. If a switch is used, it diverts packets, destined for port 80, to a proxy server. Conventionally, for fault tolerance, this proxy server is a cluster that consists of several proxy servers. These servers are directly connected to the switch and receive all client traffic. Moreover, the proxy server runs in 'promiscuous' mode, such that it accepts all connection requests regardless of the destination address. When a TCP SYN (Williams, 1998) packet, destined for port 80, is received, it is redirected to the proxy server by the switch. Neither IP nor TCP header information is altered. Next, the approach replaces the source IP address of the returned packets with the original server IP address, to establish a connection between the client and the proxy server, even though the client believes that it is connected to the original server. Once the connection is established, the proxy server receives the GET packet, and then completes the URL request, as usual. The basic mechanism is identical if a policy-based router is used in constructing a transparent proxy. The router redirects packets from port 80 to the proxy server but non-HTTP traffic is routed to the Internet. More information about transparent proxy formed by packet redirection can see the studies (Legedza, 1998; Williams, 1998) .
Intercepted packets. Packet interception hijacks clients' requests and forwards them to a proxy server. Conventionally, the hijacking program must be placed at focal points of the network, to ensure that IP packets of an intercepted TCP connection are captured. When this program listens to the first TCP SYN packet of a connection, it stores information about the connection, such as the IP address and TCP port number of both the client and the original server. The address of the destination server is then replaced with that of the proxy server, and the packet is returned to the network. All subsequent packets derived from the same client and TCP port number are also forwarded to the proxy. On the reverse path, the interception program also receives both the ACK SYN packets and the subsequent packets, which return from the proxy to the client. The source IP address and port number of these packets are then altered to the original server's IP address and port number so that the client believes that it is connected to the original server. More information about transparent proxy accomplished by packet interception can see the researches (Cohen, 1999; Danzig, 1998; Heddaya, 1998; Krishnan, 1999; Rodriguez, 2000) . Table I 
Disadvantages
The layer 4 switch or router requires reconfiguration, causing difficulty for the system on-line/ off-line. Access is slower.
Packets are probably lost when the network is congested. The interception program must be deployed at focal points in the network.
Nontransparent proxy
This approach requires users manually to program their browsers to use proxy servers.
The problems are as follows.
Users do not know how to use proxy servers.
Users prefer not to use proxy servers.
Documents relating to the use of proxy servers, such as FAQ, can be posted on well-known portal Web sites or news boards, to promote the use of the servers. Training courses also help users take advantage of using proxy servers.
A proxy with fast Web retrieval can be employed to attract the attention of users. If such a proxy could be developed, then users originally opposed to the use of a proxy may begin to use it. A policy-based router can be configured to dedicate sufficient bandwidth to a proxy server, thereby accelerating it. The TANet adopts this method and most of its users utilize proxy servers to retrieve Web pages. The TANet backbone routers are configured to reserve fixed broad bandwidth (approximately 64Mbps to a total of 155Mbps) for a cluster of proxy servers at regional network centers in Taiwan. Users of these proxy servers enjoy far better WWW service because of this reserved bandwidth. Figure 2 illustrates an alternative method for use when a policy-based router is unavailable. In this method, the proxy server is equipped with a private high-speed link. It also guarantees sufficient bandwidth for use by the proxy. The high-speed link can be an ADSL (Tanenbaum, 1996) , because it is cheap and fast. Currently, many universities in Taiwan accelerate their WWW service in this manner.
If users still decline to take advantage of proxy servers and insist on directly retrieving WWW servers, then the Web servers themselves must implement appropriate mechanisms to block abnormal access. Several studies (Abdelzaher, 1999; Chandra, 2000; explore this area.
Finally, we introduce an approach to enforcing proxy use in a nontransparent strategy.
This scheme is similar that of the transparent proxy except in that all packets, destined to port 80, are redirected to a WWW server, rather than a proxy. This WWW server stores documents concerning proxy servers; hence users can conveniently learn how to use the servers. This scheme does not hijack the packets to proxy servers so users can still retrieve Web pages via the servers.
Implementation
A system, ProxyBreaker, was realized to demonstrate the approaches. 
ProxyBreaker's design
A proxy application, SQUID (Tseng, 1999; Wessels, 2001) , was selected for enhancement to support Web usage control, because SQUID is popular on the Internet and has been adopted by numerous universities and institutions. An external module, ProxyBreaker, was developed to achieve Web usage control owing to the frequent version updating of SQUID. This approach avoided the need to maintain codes for the various SQUID versions. The log analysis method was used to integrate the module described here with SQUID.
ProxyBreaker's architecture Figure 3 depicts the system's architecture. The ProxyBreaker is comprised of three components -an extractor, a controller and a viewer. The extractor collects usage information from the access log of the proxy server. The extracted information is saved in intermediate files.
The controller then analyzes the files and reconfigures the proxy server accordingly. The viewer provides a user interface for browsing the usage information.
The extractor
The SQUID's log (Wessels, 2001 ) is a plain text file composed of lines separated by newline characters. Each line records a user's access. Typically, the log size for a busy proxy server is very large (nearly 1 Gbytes daily at NCU) such that the extractor merely collects necessary data from the log and stores it in intermediate files for further processing, reducing processing time and occupied disk space. The system selects four fields from the log -time, The extractor employs two hash tables to store usage information. One saves client usage and the other saves Web server usage. The key to the first table is the string that cascades the client's address and the Web server's address, and then we can aggregate the usage of the same client-server pair. Similarly, the key to the second table is the string that cascades the Web server's address and the client's address. We can also aggregate the usage of the same server-client pair. The extractor writes the hash tables into the intermediate files when the log analysis is complete.
The extractor periodically analyzes the access log and generates the intermediate files. As mentioned in the preceding section, the overuse margin determines the analysis period. The extractor calculates the current average transmission rate as it generates the intermediate files.
The margin divided by the average transmission rate equals the subsequent analysis period. For example, suppose the margin equals 2 Mbytes and the current average transmission rate equals 20 Kbytes/sec: the next analysis will be performed after 100 (2000/20) seconds. The period has a lower bound to avoid serious performance degradation caused by extremely frequent log analysis and SQUID reconfiguration.
The controller
The controller is responsible for checking Web usage according to usage control lists.
Initially, the controller loads two configuration files to obtain the usage control list. The first file includes four fields and specifies client-to-server usage limits. The first field is the client address range; the second is the address range of the WWW server; the third is the time and the last is the maximum usage at this time. The second configuration file stores server-to-client usage limits, and its format is similar to that of the first configuration file, but with the order of 
The viewer
The viewer is designed using CGI programs and is used to read the intermediate file to
reveal usage information. The viewer supports HTTP for ease of use and portability. The administrator and users can retrieve their usage information through browsers.
ProxyBreaker's realization
The ProxyBreaker was coded in Perl language and was operated on a personal computer with a Pentium II 400 processor, and two 10/100 Mbps net cards. The operating system was FreeBSD (FreeBSD, 2001) . protocols, such as SMTP and FTP. The general-purpose proxy serves most HTTP requests but those for electronic journals are redirected to the proxy server with ProxyBreaker, which is configured only to accept connections to electronic journals. Accordingly, clients can connect to electronic publication sites through these proxy servers, but their use remains controlled.
Related work
Some universities (NCTU, 2001; NSYSU, 2001; NTU, 2001) on TANet have also adopted the log analysis method to enhance their proxy servers to control Web usage. However, their servers fail to support real-time control. Their systems measure WWW usage every 24 hours. As a result, a situation as described previously, can easily occur. Furthermore, those systems do not prioritize Web service among different WWW servers and clients.
Several management tools for SQUID are now introduced. The Multi-Router Traffic Grapher (MRTG) (Oetiker, 2001 ) is an application that monitors network traffic loads. It generates Web pages that include GIF images which visually represent the network traffic.
MRTG is not limited to monitoring network status. Rather, it can monitor any SNMP MIB (Perkins, 1997) variable. In fact, using data generated by external programs, it can be applied to monitor system loads, login sessions and much else.
Calamaris (Beermann, 2000 (Gleeson, 2000) , PY_Squid_Stats (Ramahefason, 2000) , WebLog (Mark, 2000) and Squeezer (Kozinski, 2000) .
Finally, two SQUID page filters, SquidGuard (Baltzersen, 2000) and Squirm (Foote, 2000) , are described. They are installed on the proxy servers to protect children from adult or violent contents. The functions of the filters are similar. They can both reject requests for some particular WWW servers, and can check whether incoming URLs contain a specific string. The
URLs are blocked if the string is found. According to Tseng's study (Tseng, 1999) , SquidGuard performs far better than Squirm. Table II compares these tools. Access control indicates that a system can statically reject a request from a user, or to a server, according to a specified access control list. A system with usage control can dynamically monitor access in response to the generated traffic. The URL filter indicates that a system blocks a request if the requested URL contains a specific string. 
